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SYMEON SYMEONIDES**
The so-called revolution in American conflicts law, at least in its avant-garde
version of governmental interest analysis, has not only subsided by now but has been
almost overcome by an equally forceful counter-revolution. Indeed, one fears that the
very purpose of this Symposium is to pronounce the death of the former and the
victory of the latter. Dead or not, the conflicts revolution has, both in victory and
defeat, taught us some valuable lessons which its critics are all but ready to forget.
The most important lesson can be derived from the revolution's own gravest error: a
holistic, all-or-nothing mentality best exemplified in the often quoted statement of the
revolution's chief protagonist, Professor Brainerd Currie, urging that the entire
traditional conflicts system be "scrap[ped]... without entertaining vain hopes that
a new 'system' will arise to take its place."' Although this statement sounds more
extreme today than it did when made, it should have been as clear then as it is now
that what the system needed was a benign, quiet evolution rather than a violent
revolution. Fortunately, neither the system nor the revolution was scrapped. This was
true at least until today, when the revolution's critics2 appear ready to scrap it without
even retaining some of its components to be used as spare parts in the ongoing and
much needed process of renovating the American conflicts system. Repeating Cur-
rie's excesses, some of these critics denounce interest analysis in the same holistic and
undiscriminating fashion3 in which he had rejected the traditional system and often
* Copyright 1985 by Symeon Symeonides. This is an abridged excerpt from a longer work which is to appear
shortly in the Louisiana Law Review. Acknowledgments for the title are due to Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in
Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. Rsv. 377 (1966). Professor Ehrenzweig was a revolutionary before
the revolution and a counter-revolutionary during the revolution.
** Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center LL.B. (Private Law) 1972, LL.B. (Public Law)
1973, University of Thessaloniki (Greece); LL.M. 1974, S.J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School.
I. B. CuRm, SELEcE EssAYs oN THE CoNTrcr oF LAws 185 (1963).
2. Since its inception in the early 1960's, interest analysis has had as many critics as it has had adherents. For early
criticisms in this country see, inter alia, Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 463 (1960); Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REv. 641 (1968);Twerski,
Neumeier v. Kuehner. Where are the Emperor's Clothes? I HoFsrRA L. Rev. 93 (1973); von Mehren, Book Review, 17
J. LEGAL ED. 91 (1964). For early European criticisms see Evrigenis, Tendances Doctrinales Actuelles en Droit
International Prive, 118 REcIuL DES Cotrs 313 (1966); Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 REcus. DES CouRs 91
(1964). In recent years, criticisms of interest analysis have multiplied. Among the most outspoken recently published
critiques are Bodenheimer, The Need for a Reorientation in American Conflicts Law, 29 HsmsNss L.J. 731 (1978);
Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MescER L. REv. 556 (1984); Brilmayer,
Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MrcH. L. Rev. 392 (1980); Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 Wis. & MARv L. REv. 173 (1983); Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology:
A Dialogue, 32 Hssrms L.J. 1644 (1981); Hill, Choice ofLaw and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 CoLutm. L. REv.
960 (1981); Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 Ai. J. Co.MP. L. 1 (1984); Korn, The
Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 Cowrl. L. REv. 772 (1983); Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening
of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 889 (1981); Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules,
81 CoLuM. L. Rev. 946 (1981); Trautman, Reflections on Conflict-of-Law Methodology: A Dialogue, 32 HASTwNGS L.J.
1609 (1981); Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice ofLaw, 10 HoFsTRA L.
REv. 149 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, supra note 2, at 556
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paint with a brush which is broad enough to sweep away many other policy-oriented
approaches to choice of law.4
This Article takes issue with this all-or-nothing, "with-us-or-against-us" atti-
tude of the critics of interest analysis. However, this is not an article in defense of
interest analysis which is, after all, so eloquently defended by others. 5 Prosaic as this
may sound, interest analysis is neither to be renounced nor espoused in toto. And, if
forced to choose, this writer would have little difficulty opting for the former rather
than the latter choice. Fortunately, however, and despite the purism of both interest
analysts and their critics, no such wholesale choice is forced upon us. Conceding that
interest analysis, as conceived by Currie, has by now exhausted its utility as a
self-contained choice of law methodology does not and should not mean that interest
analysis should be buried and forgotten. Many of the ideas introduced by and
contained in interest analysis are still viable and have a lot to contribute to the
renovation of American conflicts doctrine. If our objective is to move forward rather
than backward, if our goal is revisionism rather than counter-revolution, these ideas
must be identified and retained. The purpose of this Article is to distinguish between
the tenable and the untenable ingredients of interest analysis and to seek a middle, and
hopefully common, ground between the revolution and the counter-revolution. As
middlemen are usually disliked by both sides, this writer expects little empathy from
either interest analysts or their critics, but rather accusations from both for "unprin-
cipled eclecticism" or "mishmash." 6 Be that as it may, American conflicts law, like
American common law in general, has less to fear from experimental eclecticism than
from inflexible intellectual purism.
I. CURRIE'S DENOUNCEMENT OF CHOICE OF LAW RULES
The first symptom of Currie's holistic mentality was his wholesale rejection of
the established conflicts system7 in favor of an entirely ad hoc approach. 8 Although
("interest analysis is methodologically bankrupt"). The critics of interest analysis also refuse to consider the contributions
of a whole new generation of scholars that have improved significantly on the original version of interest analysis. Among
these scholars are Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFsrRA L. REV. 149 (1973);
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN'. L. REv. 1 (1963); Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law
in the Courts, 34 MEcER L. REV. 521 (1983); Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Lav: An Analysis
and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181 (1977).
4. Most prominent among the modem policy-oriented approaches that may be endangered by undiscriminating
attacks on interest analysis are the approaches of Cavers, von Mahren and Trautman, Weintraub, and McDougal. See D.
CAVERS, TuE CHoicE OF LAW PRocrss (1965); A. VON MEFREN & D. TkAtMAN, THE LAW Or MULISTATE PROBi..Nis (1965); R.
\VEWu=Am, COMMENTARY ON THE CONEc OF LAws (2d ed. 1980); McDougal, Comprehensive Interest Analysis Versus
Reformulated Governmental Interest Analysis: An Appraisal in the Context of Choice-of-Law Problems Concerning
Contributory and Comparative Negligence, 26 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1979). Although differing in many respects from
interest analysis, the above approaches share with interest analysis a strong policy orientation and a great deal of
functionalism; thus, they may be as susceptible as interest analysis to the attacks of its critics.
5. See, e.g., Allo, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Response, 35 MERcER L. REv. 565 (1984);
Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Lairs: A Response to the 'Nev Critics,' 34 MERcR L.
REV. 593 (1983); Weinberg, On Departingfrom Forum Law, 35 MEeceR L. REv. 595 (1984); Weintraub, Interest Analysis
in the Conflict of Laws as an Application of Sound Legal Reasoning, 35 MERcER L. REv. 629 (1984).
6. Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MEecER L. REV. 645 (1983).
7. See B. CuRamE, supra note 1, at 185: "Iw]e would indeed do well to scrap the system of choice-of-law
rules . . . without entertaining vain hopes that a new 'system' will arise to take. its place."
8. See id at 627:
ITIhe method I advocate is the method of statutory construction, and of interpretation of common-law rules, to
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his own research was confined mostly to the area of contracts and torts,9 Currie
became genuinely convinced that the entire system embodied in the first conflicts
Restatement' o was unworkable and should be "scrapped."" Had he stopped there,
Currie would have had many followers until today. Instead, in a typical legal realist
fashion, Currie pushed to the extreme by postulating that all rules are necessarily
evil, 12 and by discouraging any efforts to develop new choice of law rules to replace
the Restatement. 13
That Currie overstated his case is obvious. 14 What is less obvious is whether he
did so intentionally. First, his wholesale rejection of all then existing choice of law
rules was not only unjustified in light of his own rather limited research, but was also
based on the false premise that such rules were incapable of expressing or effectuating
governmental interests. The truth is that those rules did express governmental
interests, albeit of the kind Currie did not like, and that different, narrower, more
content-oriented, and less mechanical rules are capable of expressing and effectuating
legitimate governmental interests. It goes without saying that, had he taken that view,
Currie would probably have been a revisionist rather than a revolutionary. Second,
Currie's denouncement of efforts to develop new choice of law rules was inconsistent
with his own proud adherence to the common law method 15 and, more particularly,
the doctrine of stare decisis. 16 It seems likely that, while excessive in intensity,
Currie's rule-skepticism was rather temporary in scope. Currie was simply afraid that
the premature formulation of new choice of law rules would arrest the development
of his infant doctrine before it could be perfected by trial and error. 17 It is highly
determine their applicability to mixed cases. While there are some general principles to guide us, statutory
construction must always be an ad hoc process. The distinctive virtue of the common law system is that it also
proceeds on an ad hoc basis. I am proud to associate myself with the common law tradition.
9. See Hill's criticism on this point in Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, supra note 2, at 463, 473, and Curde's response to it in B. CUtsME, supra note 1, at 586-89. See also Currie's
own admission about fields he did not study, such as property, in Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLui.
L. REv. 1219, 1241 (1963).
10. REsrAm ENr oF CoNwucr oF Lws (1934).
11. See B. CuRu, supra note 7.
12. See B. CuuE, supra note I, at 180: "In attempting to use the rules we encounter difficulties that stem not from
the fact that the particular rules are bad, . . .but rather from the fact that we have such rules at all." See also id. at 616:
"I regard choice-of-law rules as an obstruction to clear analysis and hence to progress." See also id. at 183: "We would
be better off without choice-of-law rules."
13. See Curde, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 9, at 1219, 1241: '[N]ew efforts to find short cuts
and syntheses should be sternly discouraged. We are beginning to recover from a long siege of intoxication resulting from
overindulgence in generalties; for a while, at least, otal abstinence should be enforced."
14. Cf. Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice of Law Rules, supra note 2, at 946, 950: "Currie may have been as
wrong in his all-out rejection of the utility of choice-of-law principles and rules as the old school was in its all-out worship
of the mechanistic rules and the territorialist and vested rights dogmas that supported them."
15. See B. Cuem, supra note 8.
16. Cf. Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice of Law Rules. supra note 2, at 950: "[E]ven an ad hoc result oriented.
do-justice approach creates precedents that must be followed; and inevitably this leads to the growth of rules of general
applicability." Professor Sedler, one of Currie's staunchest defenders, maintains that interest analysis rejects only what
he calls "choice-of-law rules," i.e., rules formulated a priori, but not "rules of choice of law," i.e., rules produced a
posteriori through the normal workings of stare decisis. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules:
Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 978, 983 (1977). While Sedler's view on this issue may
represent the position of interest analysis today (see infra notes 20-23), it does not reflect accurately Curde's own thesis.
See B. Cutuum, supra note 12. In the words of Professor Rosenberg, Currie "was against every last trace of rules for
choice-of-law whether they came first or last." Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice of Law Rules, supra note 2, at 950.
17. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & Co~rvtssp. PRoss. 754, 755 (1963): "Quite apart from what
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probable that, had he lived longer, Currie would have either overcome these fears or
he would have been so disillusioned by the anarchy unleashed by his revolution that
he would have resorted to the certainty of new choice of law rules. 18
The time has come for interest analysts to renounce Currie's sterile attitude
toward legal rules and to work for the development of new choice of law rules that
will avoid the shortcomings of the old-so effectively demonstrated by Currie-and
that will incorporate as much as necessary of the new teachings. After twenty years
of experimentation with ad hoc approaches, there is enough uncertainty to make such
rules necessary and sufficient accumulation of experience to make them feasible.
Despite suggestions to the contrary,' 9 policy-oriented approaches, including interest
analysis, are susceptible of being compressed into narrow, content-oriented rules,
provided one is willing to sacrifice some revolutionary purity. Professors Cavers, 20
Sedler, 21 Weintraub22 and Judge Fuld 23 have already formulated such rules or
principles, and, despite what one might think, legislatures are not far behind.24
Although far from perfect, these rules represent the current state of the revolution in
its strive for maturity and deserve the attention of the critics as much as did the
original version of interest analysis.
II. THE DOMESTICATION OF THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
To fill the vacuum left by his rejection of the rules and the conflictual method 25
of the Restatement, Currie resorted, like Cook, to the method of statutory construction
I believe to be the inherent futility of such an undertaking, deep-freezing seems hardly the indicated treatment for a
discipline just emerging from its Ice Age." See also, Currie, supra note 13.
18. Compare the authoritative statement of Justice Traynor. "I welcome the search of scholars for a priori
principles, despite misgivings as to those that have thus far been proposed." Traynor, War and Peace in the Conflict of
Laws, 25 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 121, 127 (1976). See also Cavers' parallel experience in note 20 infra.
19. For the notion that interest analysis is incapable of producing any rules because it is based on the content of
competing laws and their underlying policies which will usually differ from case to case, see Reese, ChiefJudge Fuld and
Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 559-60 (1971): "The problem is made more acute by the fact that either different
policies, or policies of different intensity, may underlie the identically worded statutes or decisional rules of two or more
states. As a result, a decision involving a statute or rule of one state will not be a conclusive precedent in a case involving
even an identically worded statute or rule of another state."
20. Himself one of the precursors of the revolution as early as 1933, Cavers grew progressively tired of the
uncertainty generated by the new approaches, and, in 1965, he proposed five "principles of preference" for torts and one
for contracts. See D. CAvERs, upra note 4, at 139-81 (1965). See also his one principle for products liability in Cavers,
The Proper Law of Producer's Liability, 26 IWt'L & Co'p. L.Q. 703 (1977).
21. See Sedler's nine rules for torts cases in Sedler, supra note 16, at 1033-41.
22. See Weintraub's rules for torts and contracts in R. Wrun.Aua, supra note 4, at 346, 382.
23. See Judge Fuld's three rules for guest statute cases in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 254,
335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
24. For instance, the newly enacted statutes on quasi-community are good examples of modem choice of law rules
of the kind that would please many contemporary conflicts theorists. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CoDE §§ 66, 101, 102, 120
(Deering 1983); TEx. FAM. CODs ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1981); Uniform Distribution of Community Property Rights
at Death Act § 3 (adopted in 8 states). Louisiana is currently engaged in a comprehensive codification of its conflicts law,
and this writer has the privilege of serving as Reporter for this project.
25. The term "conflictual method" is used in Europe to denote the classic method of private international law
which relies on indicative rules, i.e., choice of law rules which do not technically dispose of the merits of a multistate
dispute but simply indicate the legal order that would furnish the applicable substantive law. The conflictual method
presupposes a sharp division between substantive and conflicts law, proceeds on a priori rules which select the applicable
law without regard to its content, and aims at conflicts justice more than at substantive justice.
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and interpretation employed by courts in fully domestic cases. 26 In Currie's words,
"[j]ust as we determine by that process how a statute applies in time, and how it
applies to marginal cases, so we may determine how it should be applied to cases
involving foreign elements.'"27 Thus, rather than selecting the applicable law without
regard to its content, Currie would, like Cavers, focus directly on the content of the
substantive laws of the states implicated in the conflict. His ordinary process of
construction and interpretation 28 would reveal the policies underlying those laws and
would, in turn, determine their intended sphere of operation in space. There are three
distinct though interrelated ideas in this feature of Currie's analysis which merit
separate discussion. The first is the notion that the domestic process is at all capable
of producing solutions to choice of law problems. The second is the notion that the
ordinary method of interpretation can safely and efficiently pinpoint the policies
underlying the competing substantive law rules, especially foreign ones. The third is
the notion that the policies of a given rule of law may help determine its intended
sphere of operation in space.
Currie's confidence that the domestic method is capable of producing adequate
solutions to multistate problems is not necessarily unjustified, 29 provided that in
employing this method one avoids the temptation that Currie did not avoid-assuming
a narrow, ethnocentric perspective. Currie was by no means an iconoclast in rejecting
the existence of an overarching legal order which delineates affirmatively and in
advance the legislative jurisdiction of each state. His idea that, in searching for choice
of law solutions, the forum should look inward rather than upward was not new. 30 In
fact, Currie was unknowingly importing to this country the debate between nation-
alism and universalism3 t and between unilateralism and bilateralism 32 which for
26. See B. Ctum, supra note 8.
27. B. CtRm, supra note 1, at 184.
28. B. Coasm, supra note 8.
29. Currie's critics charge that "domestic interpretation and conflicts interpretation are different enterprises
altogether." See, e.g., Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth ofLegislative Intent, supra note 2, at 417. Indeed, they
may have different objectives, but theprocess of interpreting cannot be too different. Rosenberg's charge that, by resorting
to the domestic method, Currie "inescapably" implies that "the 'foreign elements' in a case do not call for a distinctive
mode of refereeing," Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice of Law Rules, supra note 2, at 947, may be a correct
description of Currie's attitude, but it is by no means an inevitable proposition. It is not inconceivable that one may employ
the domestic method, i.e., the teleological method of interpretation, and yet be guided by internationalistic motives with
built-in mechanisms of self-refereeing, or, rather, self-restraint. In fact, even Currie recognized the existence of these
restraints when he spoke of the forum's "rational altruism." See infra notes 86, 87. More puzzling is Professor Leflar's
criticism, quoted with approval by Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 392
n.3, that "It]he term 'statutory construction' is no more than a pretentious disguise for application of the court's conflicts
law." Leflar, Choice-of-law Statutes, 44 TENN. L. Rv. 951,954 (1977). If the word conflicts was put there consciously,
it is hard to see why the forum needs any disguise in applying its own conflicts law. If Professor Leflar meant to refer
to the forum's substantive law, then the criticism is rather surprising, coming from a scholar whose "better-law approach"
is potentially a much less thinly disguised euphemism for the application of the substantive law of the forum.
30. Cf. Traynor, supra note 18, at 122: "It is no longer possible to play superjudge when there is no superlaw."
31. For a good presentation of the universalist and nationalist perceptions of private international law in Europe
around the turn of the century, see De Nova, Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict of Laws, 118 REcuEn.
DEs CoutRs 435, 452-64, 471-77 (1966). The European nationalists eventually won the day, but they were much less
ethnocentric than Currie. Nationalist theories surfaced in this country in the writings of W. CooK, THE LoolicA. mtD LEoAL
BASES OF Thm CoNuucr oF LA%S (1942), and E. LoRmn-aN, SE.EcrED AR'tcLas o.; niE CoNaucr oF LAws (1947). Currie simply
continued that tradition.
32. For a comprehensive exposition of the new unilateralist approach to choice of law in Europe, see Gothot, Le
Renouveau de la Tendance Unilateraliste en Droit International Prive, 60 REv. CrMQuE uE DRorr INrrERAMtONAL Prve 1,
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centuries had marked the European conflicts scene. This was refreshing for a country
so long dominated by Bealian bilateralism and almost inevitable for a system
characterized by hostility toward legislative solutions to choice of law problems.
Disillusioned by Beale's conflictual method and unguided by legislative directives, it
is not surprising that American judges turned an eager ear to Currie's call for a return
to the familiar domestic method of interpretation. Besides filling the vacuum left by
the collapse of Bealian systematics and taking the magic out of choice of law
adjudication, the domestic method of interpretation has enriched the choice of law
process by making available to it the vast resources of the domestic common law
process. 33 It has also introduced functionalism into choice of law thinking, has
allowed a more individualized approach to cases, and has tempered the conflictual
method by injecting into it considerations of substantive justice. 34 As long as
legislatures do not intervene, and as long as there is no consensus on a new conflictual
method to replace the Restatement, the domestic method will remain the vehicle for
guiding American conflicts law from revolution to maturity. To be sure, the domestic
method must and can be severed from Currie's notorious forum favoritism. 35
Currie's confidence that the ordinary method of interpretation can pinpoint the
policies underlying the competing substantive laws has been strongly questioned by
a number of commentators. 36 To the extent it pertains to the ascertainment of forum
policies, this skepticism implies a hardly justified lack of confidence in the resources
of teleological interpretation. 37 To put it more bluntly, "[t]he most important lesson
taught in the first year of law school is that an intelligent decision to apply or not to
apply a legal rule depends upon knowing the reasons for the rule.' '38 Ascertaining
these reasons may not always be easy, but it is no more difficult than in ordinary
domestic cases and, in any event, better than "flipping the coin.'' 39 This is not
theology;40 it is teleology. Admittedly, teleology has its limits when the rule under
interpretation is that of another state, especially a foreign country. "Intra-mural
209, 415 (1971). The similarity between Currie's approach and that of the European neo-unilateralists, as well as with
the theory of "rules of immediate application," is discussed more fully in S. Symeonides, An Outsider's View of the
American Approach to Choice of Law: Comparative Observations on Current American and Continental Conflicts
Doctrine, 267-89 (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, on reserve with the Harvard Law School Library, 1980).
33. Cf. Weintraub, supra note 5, at 630: "I do share Professor Currie's belief that the evils that had beset conflicts
methodology were the result of separating the conflict of laws from the mainstream of legal reasoning; that good conflicts
analysis is good legal analysis and--this is crucial-vice versa."
34. But see Kozyris, supra note 2, at 906: "Does it really make sense to mix substantive justice with conflicts
justice?"
35. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
36. See, inter alia, Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 737; Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislatire
Intent, supra note 2, at 399, 424; Hay, supra note 2, at 1661; Juenger, supra note 2, at 33-35; Reese, supra note 19, at
559-60; Rosenberg, Two views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 Cotusi. L. REV.
459, 463-64 (1967).
37. "[Gjovemmental interest analysis is merely one of the many applications of teleological interpretation. It seeks
to determine the pertinense [sic] of rules of law to multiple-contact cases through an analysis of the purposes behind these
rules." Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Carers, The Choice-of-Law-
Process, 46 TFx. L. REV. 141, 149 (1967). For a comprehensive discussion of teleological interpretation in modem
conflicts theory, see Alexander, The Concept of Function and the Basis of Regulatory Interests Under the Functional
Choice-of-Law Theory: The Significance of Benefit and the Insignificance of Intention, 65 VA. L. REv. 1063 (1979).
38. Weintraub, supra note 5, at 631.
39. B. CuREs, supra note 1, at 121.
40. The word theology has been used several times in this Symposium to describe Currie's normative beliefs.
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speculation on the policies of other States has obvious limitations because of restricted
information and wisdom." 41 While shared legal tradition, language, and terminology
may facilitate the ascertainment of the policies underlying the law of a sister state,42
there remains the problem, largely ignored by interest analysts, 43 of interpreting the
law of a foreign country.
Less justified is the criticism of Currie's notion that, to the extent they can be
established through the interpretative process, legislative purposes can help delineate
the intended spatial operation of the particular rule of law.44 While it may be true that
"legislatures have no actual intent on territorial reach" 45 and that "policies do not
come equipped with labels proclaiming their spatial dimension," 46 it is not an
"implausible," 47 "fictional" 48 or "vain" 49 exercise-though it is admittedly a
difficult one-to infer such territorial reach or spatial dimension through the resources
of the interpretative process. This is what functional or teleological interpretation is
all about. The vitality of that method has never depended on proof of actual legislative
intent or ready labels.50 To accept this elementary idea, one need not agree with
Currie's theory nor with his particular inferences about the spatial reach of laws. 51
41. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 597, 249 N.E.2d 394, 411, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 543 (1969) (Brietel, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the experience of the New York courts with guest statutes is illustrative of the problem. In Babcock
v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), a New York Court of Appeals found that the
policy of the Ontario guest statute was to prevent collusive suits against the host's insurer. In Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d
120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), the court found another policy behind the Colorado guest statute, i.e.,
to grant injured parties in other cars priority over the ungrateful guest in the assets of the negligent driver. In Tooker v.
Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), the court had to confess that its construction of the
Colorado guest statute was mistaken. Finally, in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d
64 (1972), the court conceded that "further research ...has revealed the distinct possibility that one purpose, and
perhaps the only purpose of the statute was to protect owners and drivers against ungrateful guests." Id. at 124, 286
N.E,2d at 455, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 67. See also B. CuRoRm, supra note 1, at 384-415, where Currie devotes 30 pages to
ascertain the policy of a North Carolina statute. But see Weintraub, supra note 5, at 631-34 for good suggestions of how
to standardize this process.
42. See Trautman, supra note 2, at 1618: "[W]hen . . .communities share a common legal tradition and history,
as is ordinarily so with respect to many problems within the United States, it is usually not difficult to understand the
policies, although local circumstances may condition the speed and direction of maturation and adaptation to new
problems."
43. Like most interest analysts, see, e.g., Sedler, supra note 5, at 597-98 and Trautman, supra note 2, at 1617
n.23, Currie was exclusively preoccupied with interstate conflicts. See infra note 96.
44. See the criticisms of Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 399-402
and 417-23; Juenger, supra note 2, at 35-36; the responses of Sedler in Sedler, supra note 5, at 606-20; Sedler,
Reflections on Conflict-of.Laws Methodology, 32 H~smNs L.J. 1628, 1632-35 (1981); and Weintraub, supra note 5, at
630-34.
45. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 393. (emphasis deleted,
emphasis added).
46. Juenger, supra note 2, at 35.
47. Id.
48. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 431 ("It is a fiction to speak
of 'legislative intent."').
49. Juenger, supra note 2, at 35.
50. Cf. Sedler, Reflections on Conflict-of.Laws Methodology. supra note 44; Weintraub, supra note 5, at 630-34.
51. Professor Brilmayer is right in charging that "Currie's principles of inference were rather a product of his own
normative beliefs about how certain policies ought to reach." Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative
Intent, supra note 2, at 400. This author, for one, strongly disagrees with those inferences. But, in fairness to Currie, it
should be remembered that he never tried to justify his inferences "as expressions of actual legislative intent regarding
a statute's territorial scope." Id. at 393 (emphasis added). Professor Brilmayer may also be right in that what she calls
"substantive intent," i.e., legislative purpose as deduced in domestic cases, cannot "'by itself provide a sufficient basis
for conflict of laws decisions," id. (emphasis added), but only if she would agree in this italicization.
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Neither should one be labelled a medieval statutist for accepting the notion that the
spatial reach of laws can best be determined by looking to their purpose, as long as
it is understood that such determination goes at best only half way toward actually
resolving a conflicts problem. The second half of the process, in which Currie's
insights were much less inspiring, is to actually and rationally accommodate laws with
overlapping spatial reach.
Conceding that the domestic method of interpretation is capable of producing
adequate solutions to multistate problems does not, of course, mean that it is the only
method. For the domestic method may well coexist with and complement the
conflictual method, as it has for centuries in Europe.5 2 Traditionally, the former
method enters only when the latter defaults. Currie's contribution to contemporary
choice of law methodology must be confined to demonstrating the deficiencies of the
particular conflictual method which had completely displaced the domestic method
during the Bealian era. Once this is understood, the way will be open for building,
by legislative, judicial, or academic fiat, the new conflictual method in those areas
where experience permits. The domestic method will, of course, remain the gap-filler
in the remaining areas, as well as the standard by which to judge the success of the
new conflictual method.
III. THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
According to Currie, whenever a case falls within the spatial reach of a law as
delineated by the interpretative process, the state from which that law emanates has
an interest in applying it in order to effectuate the law's underlying purposes. 53
Despite what the term might imply, an interest is not the unilateral wish of the
enacting state to apply its law in a given case. It is rather the result of the judge's
evaluation of this wish in the light of factual elements which connect the enacting state
with the case at hand.54 In Currie's words, an "interest ... is the product of (a) a
governmental policy and (b) the concurrent existence of an appropriate relationship
between the state having the policy and the transaction, the parties, or the litiga-
tion." 55 And in the words of one of Currie's followers, a state's interest consists in
making "effective, in all situations involving persons as to whom it has responsibility
52. See, e.g., the European theories of "laws of immediate application," and "spatially conditioned substantive
rules" in S. Symeonides, supra note 32.
53. "The court should . . . inquire whether the relationship of the forum state to the case at bar-that is, to the
parties, to the transaction, to the subject matter, to the litigation-is such as to bring the case within the scope of the state's
governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion that the state has an interest in the application
of its policy in this instance." B. CupmE, supra note 1, at 189.
54. See Traynor, supra note 18, at 124:
The concept is an old one in other areas of the law, with a respectable place in the law reports of countless
jurisdictions. Its honourable history counters those who would debase it to mean identification with the partisan
interest of a State involved in litigation as a party, as in actions by or against it with respect to contracts it has
made, the torts of its agents, the vindication of its property rights, or the enforcement of its criminal laws. So
narrow a definition ignores the objectivity that is basic to the judicial process in all litigation, regardless of
whether or not it has multi-state aspects.
55. B. CuRRiE, supra note 1, at 621. But see McDougal, Choice of Law; Prologue to a Viable Interest-Analysis
Theory, 51 Tu.. L. REv. 207, 212 (1977): "[Ain interest is not the 'product' of a policy; rather a policy reflects underlying
interests . .. Interests give rise to the promulgation of policies and not vice versa."
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for legal ordering, that resolution of contending private interests the state has made
for local purposes." 56 Currie's legal realist conception of law as "an instrument of
social control" 57 is projected at the interstate level. Governments do have an interest
in the outcome of litigation between private persons in domestic as well as in conflicts
cases.
This idea has been strongly objected to by many commentators, most of whom
have continental backgrounds, who maintain that, aside from public law matters such
as currency or taxation, a state has no interest in the outcome of litigation between
private persons.5 8 Yet, leaving aside the unfortunate qualifier "governmental" 59 and
Currie's rather awkward personification of states, 60 the public-private law distinction
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, at least in the United States, important
socio-economic policies are often enunciated in the judicial rather than the executive
or the legislative chambers. Therefore, one cannot deny seriously that a state like
Michigan has a great deal at stake in a products liability action against one of
Michigan's auto industries;6' or that the tax base of a state like Nevada would feel the
impact of an adverse judicial decision in a California dram shop action against
Nevada's major industry, the casino industry. 62 Neither do foreign governments make
secret their strong concerns in the outcome of American litigation involving their
shipping industries. 63 Whether these concerns are called governmental interests or
56. Baxter, supra note 3, at 17.
57. See B. CuRRm, supra note 1, at 64:
Law is an instrument of social control. Recognition of this fact, and emphasis on the economic and social
policies expressed in laws, would lead to a fresh and constructive approach to conflict-of-laws problems. But
law is not an instrument of social control alone. It retains something of the quality and function that were
commonly attributed to it before we became so acutely conscious of its sociological role.
58. See 1 A. Eass-zvE, PRIVATE n'L. LAw 63 (1967); P. Gs.uucu, PtNcwILs Do DRorr finERNATIONAL PIvE 14
(1961); Hay, supra note 2, at 1660; Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 202,206 (1969); Kegel,
supra note 2, at 180-82; Rheinsten, How to Review a Festscrift, I 1 Ati. J. Comp. L. 632, 664 (1962). For responses to
these arguments, see D. CAvE.s, supra note 4, at 100 (1965); A. SHAP A, THE ImsRr APPROACH To CHOICE OF LAw 72-73
(1970); Baade, supra note 37, at 148-49; Sedler, supra note 3, at 191-92.
59. According to Juenger, the word governmental was "chosen to reflect [Currie's] view that the pursuit of forum
policies in conflict cases is a vital political endeavor with which courts should not interfere." Juenger, supra note 2, at
9. See also Trautman, supra note 2, at 1614:
Characterizing these interests as governmental ignores the fact that often the interests involved are individual
interests in private ordering. Although these individual interests are respected and often nurtured by govern-
mental authority, the emphasis on the governmental nature of the interest downplays a vast area of law making
by individuals and often tends to distort the issue.
60. See Juenger, supra note 2, at 9: "Currie theorized that states have an 'interest' akin to a human desire." See
also id. at n.53: "Currie ascribed human characteristics to states, postulating 'selfish' and 'blind' ones."
61. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago,
644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981) emphasizing California's
substantial interest in the economic health of corporations [such as McDonnell Douglas Corp.] which do
business within its borders . . . [California] derives substantial sales and income taxes, as well as other
revenues, directly and indirectly from a corporation's activities within the state. Indeed, California's interest is
strong with regard to a rule disallowing punitive damages because such a rule protects the economic well-being
of the corporations and therefore enhances the economic well-being of the state.
Id. at 614. Cf. Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viaeao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966); Ciprari v. Servicas Aeros Cruzeiro, S.A., 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 359
F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966).
62. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976), where the California
court did recognize Nevada's interests, although it eventually subordinated them to California's own interest.
63. In practically every major international maritime conflicts case that reached the United States Supreme Court,
at least one foreign government, and occasionally the United States as well, filed amicus curiae briefs bringing to the
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simply interests is a secondary matter, as long as their existence is recognized and as
long as they are assigned a role in the calculus of the choice of law process. The
traditional theory's failure to recognize these interests resulted in random sacrifice of
the interests of one state without promoting the interests of the other or of a common
interest of both. 64 Currie's great contribution to American choice of law thinking was
that he made us aware of this anomaly and gave us the opportunity to correct it,
although his own solutions were far from perfect.
In sum, Currie was correct in insisting that conflicts litigation implicates the
interests of states. He was also correct in looking into the competing substantive laws
in order to find these interests. Where Currie erred was in his reluctance to look to
other sources for governmental interests, in his own articulation of interests, and in
the way in which he resolved concrete conflicts of governmental interests. Each of
these points is discussed below.
IV. CURRME'S READING OF INTERESTS
Currie's reading of interests suffers from two different but interrelated flaws: (a)
his insistence that a state is interested in protecting its own residents only but not
out-of-staters, or what is referred to hereinafter as his personal law principle; and (b)
his unwillingness to recognize interests other than those reflected in the domestic laws
competing in a given case. 65
A. The Personal Law Principle
Overreacting to the Restatement's premise that laws operate territorially, Currie
moved to the other extreme by adopting the medieval notion that laws follow the
person. 66 To be sure, Currie was much too sophisticated to use simplistic terms of this
kind; however, when the jargon is cleared away, this is the central thought that
emerges. 67 In almost all circumstances, Currie deduces the legitimacy of state
interests from the domicile of the parties. Furthermore, he articulates state interests
Court's attention their respective interests in the outcome of the pending litigation between shipowners and seamen. For
extensive discussion of this issue and pertinent citations, see Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts Law from the Perspective
of Modern Choice of Law Methodology, 7 MAR. LAw. 223, 224-25, 228, 247 (1982).
64. SeeB. Cusm, supra note 1, at 191: "Traditional doctrine often requires a state to sacrifice its own interest even
though the interest of no other state is thereby advanced."See also id. at 589-90, referring to Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass.
374 (1878): "In the case of married women's contracts, . . .application of the law of the place of contracting subverts
domestic policy without advancing foreign policy in four of the fourteen possible cases, and subverts foreign policy
without advancing domestic in two additional cases."
65. A third weakness is Currie's unwillingness to consider the expectations and interests of private parties except
to the extent that these interests are subsumed under the interests of their respective states. See Cwum, supra note 1, at
610: "I can find no place in conflict-of-laws analysis for a calculus of private interests. By the time the interstate plane
is reached the resolution of conflicting private interest has been achieved; it is subsumed in the statement of the laws of
the respective states.'" But see Currie's letter to Cavers in Cavers, A Correspondence vith Brainerd Currie, 1957-58, 34
Muscrx L. Rsv. 471, 488 (1983): "I shall not admit that I am unwilling to consider the claims of human beings to justice
unless I can fit them into the conception of state interests."
66. See Juenger, supra note 2, at 9-10: "Currie resuscitated the medieval notion of a personal law, and his approach
accords the domiciliary nexus a much more pervasive scope than it had ever enjoyed in Anglo-American jurisprudence."
Kom, supra note 2, at 811: "[Currie's] system firmly links each state's interest to the fortunes of its domiciliaries."
67. "[Currie's] entire method amounts to little more than a complicated way of saying that the law of the domicile
govems." Juenger, supra note 2, at 39.
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such that each state is interested in protecting its own domiciliaries but not out-of-
staters similarly situated. 68 Thus, aside from conduct-regulating laws-which operate
territorially and bind or benefit everybody within the territory regardless of resi-
dence 69-protective laws follow the defendant and compensatory laws follow the
plaintiff.70 A state with a defendant-protective rule, such as the rule of contractual
incapacity involved in Milliken v. Pratt7' and Lilienthal v. Kaufman,72 or the guest
statute involved in Babcock v. Jackson,73 has an interest in applying it to benefit
resident defendants but not out-of-staters, regardless of where the contract was made
or the accident occurred. 74 Similarly, a state with a pro-plaintiff law, such as a
compensatory rule, has an interest in applying it to benefit its own residents only,75
regardless of where they were injured. Nonresidents injured within the state with the
compensatory law may also benefit from it, but not for their own sakes. Instead, they
benefit for the sake of local medical creditors who may otherwise remain unpaid, and
because of the possibility that an indigent victim may become a public ward. 76
68. Professor Sedler disputes strongly the proposition that "a state's real interest in applying a rule of substantive
law in order to implement the policies reflected in that law is limited to residents and does not extend to nonresidents."
Sedler, supra note 5, at 620. A closer reading of his response, however, reveals that his disputation is limited to
admonitory or regulatory laws which, according to him and Currie, operate territorially "totally apart from the residence
of the actor or the victim." Id. at 622. Sedler does not dispute that "in the typical accident case, the relevant interests
are compensatory and protective ones, and a state's interest in applying its law in order to implement those policies indeed
depends on a party's residence in that state." Id. at 621. For a fresh view of the problem of discriminating against forum
nonresidents, see Weinberg, supra note 5, at 596-97.
69. See Currie's discussion of traffic laws and Sunday laws in B. CrauFm, supra note 1, at 58-61.
70. Regulatory in this sense are all rules regulating or deterring certain kinds of conduct. Protective are all laws
limiting or eliminating the defendant's liability, such as rules imposing a ceiling on the amount of recovery, rules of
intrafamily immunity, guest statutes, rules of contractual incapacity, etc. Compensatory are the laws designed to ensure,
facilitate, or increase the victim's recovery. Currie did not use these exact categories, but he did speak about the regulatory,
protective, or compensatory policies of given rules of law. Currie also recognized that oftentimes more than one, and
sometimes all three, of these policies may underlie a given rule of law. If so, the enacting state may be interested on more
than one ground. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 199-200.
71. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
72. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). Lilienthal is not discussed by Currie as it was decided shortly before his
death. However, like Milliken, Lilienthal involves a contract made outside the forum state by a person incapable of
contracting under forum law. In both situations Currie would favor the application of the law of the forum to vindicate
the forum's interest in protecting its residents. See Currie's discussion of Milliken in B. CrauE, supra note 1, at 85-86:
Massachusetts . . . believes . . . that married women constitute a class requiring special protection. It has
therefore subordinated its policy of security of transactions to its policy of protecting married woman ...
What married women? Why, those with whose welfare Massachusetts is concerned, of course-i.e., Massa-
chusetts married women. In 1866 Maine emancipated (its) married women. Is Massachusetts declaring that
decision erroneous . . . ? Certainly not. . . . All that happened was that in each state the legislature weighed
competing considerations, with different results. Well, each to his own. Let Maine go feminist and modem; as
for Massachusetts, it will stick to the old ways-for Massachusetts women.
Id.
73. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
74. See B. Cwuus, supra note 1, at 724: "'Ontario has no interest at all in the application of its guest-statute ...
The guest-statute expresses a policy for the protection of defendants. The defendant here, however, is not a citizen or
resident of Ontario, he is a citizen of a state that holds him accountable for injuries to his guests."
75. See Currie's discussion of New York's "no damages ceiling" rule involved in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), in B. Ciuns, supra note 1, at 691-721:
New York had no interest in applying its law and policy merely because the ticket was purchased there, or
because the flight originated there. New York's policy is not for the protection of all who buy tickets in New
York, or board planes there. It is for the protection of New York people.
Id. at 705.
76. Id. at 145, 148, 150-51.
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Currie's personal law principle creates consitutional, philosophical, and meth-
odological problems which Currie tried to anticipate. At the constitutional level,
Currie insisted that his principle is "not vitiated, but rather vindicated" by the
Constitution, provided that the "pursuit of self-interest" is "rational, moderate and
controlled.' 77 Currie acknowledged indirectly, however, the potential for discrimi-
nation inherent in his analysis by saying that "employment of this method would give
a new importance to ... [the equal protection 78 and privileges and immunities79]
clauses as they affect conflict-of-laws problems."8, 0
Dean Ely has recently challenged the constitutionality of Currie's personal lav
principle, or what Ely calls the interest of states in "generat[ing] victories for their
own people in a way that they are not interested in generating victories for others." 81
Ely's thesis is that the principle itself, not just its discriminatory application, is
unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution. If that
is true, Ely says, it "spells the end of 'interest analysis' in any recognizable sense of
the term." '8 2 Professors Sedler and Weinberg have emphatically denied both
charges. 83 The instructions of this Symposium's organizers prevent consideration of
this issue here. It suffices to say, however, that even if Ely is wrong, a theory that
advocates as much as "the market will bear constitutionally" 84 cannot expect much
praise from those who believe that discretion should not be pushed to the limits of the
Constitution. 85
Currie also anticipated philosophical criticisms of his personal law principle and
responded vaguely by encouraging "rational altruism" 86 while condemning "irra-
tional altruism. '"87 But Currie never retreated from his basic premise that a state is
77. Id. at 525:
The method of approach to conflict-of-laws problems that calls for their analysis in terms of the governmental
interests of the states concerned is not vitiated, but rather vindicated, by this review of the effect of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. That method counsels the rational, moderate, and controlled pursuit of self-interest; it
also counsels that self-interest should be subordinated freely, and even gladly, to the constitutional restraints
required and made possible by federal union. Under conventional conflict-of-laws doctrine, legal scholars, and
to a lesser degree the courts under their influence, because of the compulsion of internationalist and altruist
ideals, have guiltily suppressed the natural instincts of community self-interest. The impersonal choice-of-law
rules that are employed in this process are themselves discriminatory at times, and at other times enforce a
purposeless self-denial, or an unwarranted intrusion into the concerns of other states, or an unintended and
unjustified retroactive impairment of settled rights and obligations.
Id.
78. U.S. Co.sr. amend. XIV, § 1.
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
80. B. Cum, supra note 1, at 185-86 (emphasis added).
81. Ely, supra note 2, at 173, 178.
82. Id. at 187.
83. See Sedler, supra note 5, at 620-35; Weinberg, supra note 5, at 596-97.
84. Hay, supra note 2, at 1666. See Allo, supra note 5, at 569, 580-81, for a view that tends to constitutionalize
the law of choice of law.
85. "Even if permissible within the still too wide constitutional limits, this is not in the interest of the litigation at
hand, of the legal system, or of our federal structure." Hay, supra note 2, at 1665-66.
86. See B. CuRmis, supra note 1, at 185: "The suggested analysis does not imply the ruthless pursuit of self-interest
by the states." See also id. at 186: "There is no need to exclude the possibility of rational altruism." See also id. at 549:
In a federal union such as ours there is no room for the cycle of discrimination, retaliation, and reciprocity. Each
state may and should extend the benefits of its laws to foreigners, not merely with the hope but with the assurance
that all other states will reciprocate as a matter of course.
87. See id. at 191: "Traditional doctrine often requires a state to sacrifice its own interest even though the interest
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interested in protecting only its own citizens. According to one of his friends and
corevolutionaries, such a premise "is more appropriate to a tribal system of law than
to that prevailing in the American Union." '88
At the methodological level, Currie's personal law principle provides acceptable
solutions to one category of conflicts in which the first Restatement was obviously
deficient: cases in which both litigants are from the same state, that is "false
conflicts." 89 By the same token, however, due to its emphasis on persons rather than
on the "locus," Currie's personal law principle is at an impasse in two new categories
of conflicts that were unknown to the traditional theory:90 (a) cases in which the
plaintiff comes from a pro-plaintiff state and the defendant from a pro-defendant state,
that is "true conflicts;" and (b) cases in which the plaintiff comes from a pro-
defendant state and the defendant from a pro-plaintiff state, that is the "unprovided for"
cases. 91 This impasse would not exist if Currie were willing to soften his personal law
principle by considering broader governmental interests. Also, true conflicts would
not be insolvable if Currie were to retreat from his forum favoritism and allow
weighing of interests. Admittedly, concessions of this kind would markedly alter
Currie's theory, but it could still bear the name of interest analysis.
Despite its obvious deficiencies, Currie's personal law principle has served
American conflicts doctrine by cutting down on the omnipotence of territorialism.
Although it is no longer fashionable to speak in these terms, the history of conflicts
law in any other country has been marked by the perennial conflict and compromise
between territoriality and extraterritoriality or personality. Only in America, thanks
to Story and Beale, has territorialism enjoyed such a position of dominance. Currie's
forceful advocacy of the personal law principle, though too extreme to be acceptable,
has shaken the stagnant waters and has moved American choice of law thinking away
from territoriality. 92 This is by no means a small accomplishment. But it is only the
beginning of the process. The right balance between the two grand principles of
territoriality and extraterritoriality must still be found.
of no other state is thereby advanced. . . . The rational pursuit of self-interest is preferable to such irrational altruism."
See also id. at 197: "Irrational altruism can be quite as mischievous and arbitrary as irrational provincialism."
88. D. C~vEss, supra note 4, at 151 n.29.
89. A false conflict in Currie's analysis is a case in which only one of the involved states is actually interested in
applying its law. See infra note 112. There seems to be a consensus that cases in which both parties come from the same
state should be decided by the law of that state. See, e.g., Kom, supra note 2, at 962. Under interest analysis, however,
single domicile cases are not always false conflicts. When two parties from the same state which provides recovery are
involved in an accident in a nonrecovery state, there is a false conflict and the law of the common domicile applies. When,
however, two parties from a nonrecovery state have an accident in a recovery state, there is probably an "apparent
conflict" (see infra notes 114, 115) and possibly a "true conflict" because of the accident state's policy of protecting local
creditors and deterring wrongful conduct. See Sedler, supra note 16, at 1034-35. Despite these ambiguities, however,
interest analysis achieves better results in single domicile cases than the traditional rule of lex loci delicti.
90. See Juenger, supra note 2, at 41: "Currie's major insight was that the territorially-oriented rules he attacked
created 'problems that did not exist before.' It is strange that he never noticed that his personal law principle had precisely
the same propensity."
91. See infra notes 119-23.
92. For a sample of this new thinking, see, for example, Weinberg, supra note 5, at 597 n.4: "IThe legislative
power of a state derives from its legitimate sphere of interest in the welfare of its residents. Those writers
who . . . suppose that the state can govem events but not people seem insufficiently mindful of the essential
preconditions of effective government. "
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B. Neglect for Multistate Interests
In searching for governmental interests Currie did not look to sources other than
the competing substantive laws, nor did he recognize that the interests reflected in the
domestic laws may acquire a different tenor or intensity when projected at the
interstate level. 93 Currie refused to include in his calculus the so-called multistate
interests-interests that may not be reflected directly in a state's domestic law but
which stem from the state's membership in a broader community of states. 94 Despite
his stated belief that "[t]he short-sighted, selfish state is nothing more than an
experimental model [and that] [n]o such state exists, at least in this country," 95 Currie
specifically dismissed the view that a state should be guided in its choice of law
decisions by the "needs of the interstate and international system.''96 The only
restraints he recognized were those imposed by the federal constitution, but he
probably violated those restraints himself by advocating his personal law principle.
Again, there is a certain inconsistency in Currie's thinking. It is common
knowledge that he was working with the framework of the federal system in mind,
and that he focused exclusively on interstate conflicts. 97 He attributed many of the
evils of American conflicts doctrine to its international parentage98 and pledged to
work for a new doctrine closely tailored to the needs of interstate conflicts. Yet the
prescriptions he proposed were essentially antifederal. His disregard of shared
multistate interests, his personal law principle, and his suggestion that the forum
should apply its law any time it gets a chance may be good descriptions of a cold war
era in international relations, but it is hardly a good prescription for international and
much less for interstate conflicts of law. 99 Currie's assurances that undue protection-
93. Compare with A. VON MERIZEs & D. Tt 'rmiAN, supra note 4, at 77, 215-19, 230-32; McDougal, supra note
4, at 449-50:
States may have policies and interests relevant to transactions which are adverse to the forum state's intrastate
policies and interests. Rather than rendering a decision which defeats the forum's own multistate policies and
interests, a rational and reasonable court could decide that the long-term interests of the forum will be furthered
best by the subordination of its intrastate policies. Thus, even from a parochial perspective, application of forum
law may be unjustifiable.
Also compare with Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAw &
Co srsP. PsoBs. 105-06 (1977).
94. See the criticisms of Hill, supra note 9, at 489-90; Kegel, supra note 2, at 180-82; McDougal, supra note 4,
at 447-49; Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 464; von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CoaNE. L.
REv. 927,938 (1975); von Mehren, supra note 2, at 92-93. For Currie's response, see, B. Cusu, supra note 1, at 186-87.
95. B. CusstE, supra note 1, at 616.
96. Id. at 614. Continuing Currie's intransigence, Sedler insists that "[t]he purpose of conflicts law is not to further
harmonious relations and to facilitate commercial intercourse between states, nor is it to promote multistate policies. It
is, as I have said, to provide functionally sound results. ... Sedler, supra note 5, at 601. For a more moderate view,
see Weinberg, supra note 5, at 598-601, 626.
97. Currie's analysis is based exclusively on interstate conflicts. Although he suggested in some footnotes that his
conclusions were valid in international conflicts as well (see, e.g., B. Cupu, supra note 1, at n.53, 56, 122, 190), he
did not seem to give any serious thought to international conflicts. See Evrigenis, supra note 2, at 367-68.
98. See B. CuRtu, supra note 1, at 627:
We have too long supposed that conflict-of-laws problems can be solved in accordance with a code, transplanted
from the continent of Europe. . . It is time to return to methods that are indigenous to our legal system and
that our judges and lawyers are fully competent to utilize by reason of their training and experience.
99. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 738: "[Currie's] theory fosters a state chauvinism which seems strongly out
of place in a world characterized by the interdependence of states and the need for mutual accommodation between them."
Hay, supra note 2, at 1662: "Our federal structure does not justify the elevation of state law, in general, to the position
of a forum's overriding 'governmental interest."' Trautman, supra note 2, at 1615: "[Currie's forum favoritism] seems
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ism will be curtailed by the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of
the Constitution, 100 and that excessive forum favoritism will be controlled by the due
process and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution, 10 1 are hardly convincing
or reassuring. Firstly, it is questionable policy to first encourage protectionism and
chauvinism and then to curtail it by constitutional compulsion. Secondly, as is by now
pellucidly evident from Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague,102 the Supreme Court
is moving in the opposite direction from what Currie had predicted. 103
V. No WEIGHING OF GovERNMENTAL INTERESTS
Currie fell into a double inconsistency when he asserted that American judges are
not constitutionally empowered nor qualified to weigh governmental interests. 104 This
thesis is inconsistent with Currie's own instrumental conception of law, 0 5 which
implies an activist view of the role of the judiciary and which entails a politicization
of the choice of law process. It is also inconsistent with the power Currie granted to
judges at an earlier stage of his analysis, that is, in identifying and evaluating
governmental interests in order to determine whether there is a true conflict.'1 6 This
is no less of a delicate or political function and, if judges are qualified and empowered
to discharge it, they should not lose that power the moment they encounter a true
conflict. 07 Aside from these inconsistencies, Currie's thesis on the point presupposes
a conception of the judicial process that may be agreeable to a continental scholar, 08
impermissible and essentially lawless in a multistate society." Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative
Intent, supra note 2, at 416: "A conflicts methodology based only on favoritism for local residents would surely run
counter to the established principles of the American federal system."
100. See B. CURRuE, supra note I, at 123-26, 185, 191, 280, 285.
101. Id. at 271, 280-81. "The self interest which a state is to pursue is only its moderate and legitimate interest,
and that for the states of the Union this pursuit is importantly limited by provisions of the Federal Constitution." Id. at
191.
102. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
103. See generally Kozyris, supra note 2.
104. Currie thought it would be an "embarrassment . . . [for a court] to nullify the interests of its own sovereign"
and that, in any event, the courts lack the necessary resources to choose between conflicting governmental interests. This
is a "political function of a very high order . that should not be committed to courts in a democracy." B. CURIE,
supra note 1, at 182. See also id. at 278-79.
105. See supra note 57.
106. See Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts in American Perspective, 131 RECUFIL DES CouRs 75, 148 (1970):
"Weighing of interests after interpretation is condemned: weighing of interests in interpretation, condoned, not to say,
encouraged." (emphasis added)
107. In Cavers' words,
Currie seems to me to invite the judiciary to perform essentially the same function he would forbid when he
would allow a court in State F to take into account the policy of State X in determining whether the forum's
policy should be considered in conflict with, presumably in a situation where, but for the State X policy, the
forum's law would be applied.
Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAw AND Co.rviP. PROBS. 732, 734 n.9 (1963).
See also Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie. supra note 2, at 476-77; von
Mehren, supra note 2, at 95. Currie responds by saying that
there is an important difference between a court's construing domestic law with moderation in order to avoid
conflict with a foreign interest and its holding that the foreign interest is paramount. When a court avowedly uses
the tools of construction and interpretation, it invites legislative correction of error. . . .When it weighs state
interests and finds a foreign interest weightier, it inhibits legislative intervention and confounds criticism.
Currie, supra note 17, at 759.
108. Yet even in countries like France, where strong views on the separation of powers are held, "judges have
manufactured conflicts law in full view of complacent legislatures." Juenger, supra note 58, at 206-07.
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but does not accurately portray the realities of the common law method'0 9 with which
Currie associated his interest analysis so proudly."t0 That is probably the reason why
Currie had to confess that he could not cite any unqualified acceptance of his thesis
on this point.' The same reason may explain why most of his successors have
abandoned him."t2 In fact, the major reason the interest revolution kept going after
Currie was the rejection by other scholars of this solution of despair and their pursuit
of rational ways of accommodating conflicting state interests.
VI. FALSE CONFLICTS, TRUE CONFLICTS, INTERMEDIATE CONFLICTS
Currie's chief contribution to conflicts theory is his technique of identifying and
resolving false conflicts. 113 That this technique is by now taken for granted, even by
his critics, and forms the common denominator of all current choice of law meth-
odologies is no reason to deny him the credit rightfully due to him. Even if this were
Currie's only contribution to conflicts theory, it would be sufficient to secure him a
permanent position in the conflicts "Hall of Fame." Currie may also be credited with
establishing and naturalizing in conflicts jargon the categories of apparent conflict,
true conflict, and the unprovided-for case. When used descriptively rather than
dispositively, these categories are useful in providing a common terminology and in
aiding the focus of the search for appropriate solutions. Currie's own solutions to
these conflicts, however, left much to be desired.
The apparent conflict is, in Currie's words, a case in which "each state would
be constitutionally justified in asserting an interest, but on reflection the conflict is
avoided by a moderate definition of the policy or interest of one state or the other,"
"a case in which reasonable men may disagree on whether a conflicting interest
should be asserted. 1" 4 According to another definition, an apparent conflict is a
conflict which appears to be a true one if all possible interests of the involved states
in the abstract are considered, but which may well be a false one on closer
investigation of the factual contacts and a more moderate interpretation of the policies
109. "Even since conflicts law first developed, courts did precisely what Currie would forbid them to do; no judge
has ever been impeached for inventing or applying a choice of law rule that sacrifices forum interests." Id.; "Currie's
proscription of interest-weighing seems to strike at the heart of the judicial process." Traynor, Conflict ofLaws: Professor
Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 C~uF. L. REv. 845, 852-55 (1961). Currie, who was a legal realist,
responded with a not so realistic statement: "I do not care whether courts undertake to weigh and balance conflicting
interests or not." But when they do, "such action can find its justification in politics, not in jurisprudence. . . .[L]et
us not delude ourselves with any notion that we can control or predict the process by a juridical science of conflict of
laws." B. CuRm, supra note 1, at 600-01. A more moderate explanation is found in id. at 183, 274.
110. See supra note 8.
111. Currie, supra note 17, at 758-59. See Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? 80 HAxv. L. REv.
377, 389 (1966): "As far as I can see, all courts and writers who have professed acceptance of Currie's interest language
have transformed it by indulging in that very weighing and balancing of interests from which Currie refrained." Kom,
supra note 2, at 816: "The part of Currie's systematics that has been almost universally rejected ... is the notion that
courts should not undertake to weigh state interests."
112. It seems that only Baade has remained faithful to Currie on this point. See Baade, supra note 37, at 179. Sedler,
who is also a faithful disciple of Currie, attempts to avoid the impasse by distinguishing "real" as opposed to
"hypothetical" interests. The implication is that the "hypothetical" interests may be subject to balancing while the "real"
are not. See Sedler, supra note 3, at 220-33.
113. See B. Ctious, supra note 1, at 184. This technique is so familiar in conflicts literature that no explanation or
further citation is deemed necessary.
114. Currie, supra note 17, at 763, 764.
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involved."t 5 This category is terminologically useful, for it gives a name to the gray
area lying between false and true conflicts. However, the practical utility of this
category is impaired by the fluidity and manipulability of its outer limits." 6
Currie's solution to true conflicts by the unqualified resort to the law of the forum
is the most controversial feature of his analysis. It is an indefensible solution of
despair. While some unrepentant interest analysts continue to feel otherwise," 7 and
while most critics continue to criticize interest analysis on this point as if there was
nothing else to it, this feature of interest analysis is both severable and dispensable.
Courts and commentators have already demonstrated that rational solutions to true
conflicts may be found along interest analysis lines without automatically applying
the law of the forum." 8 Whether one should call this a revised interest analysis or
comparative impairment may well be a matter of semantics.
The unprovided-for case is a category of conflicts cases for which Currie's theory
does not provide a solution other than some tentative suggestions." 9 Currie's neglect
of this category of conflicts is due to his assumption, which later proved to be wrong,
that the possibility of such cases arising in practice is very remote, 20 and also to the
fact that a theory which is based exclusively on state interests has little to say when
no state interests are at stake.121 To be sure, the lack of a conflict of interest may make
a case easier to solve, but it does not actually solve it. The judge still must find a
principled solution, and applying the law of the forum, as suggested by Currie, is
hardly consistent with the basic premises of interest, analysis. 122 Inevitably, the
judge's analysis must proceed beyond state interests in search for other choice
115. Sedler, supra note 3, at 187.
116. Currie admits this when he says that "indeed, the three classes of cases [i.e., false, apparent, true] are a
continuum with no clear internal boundaries" and when he says that reasonable men may disagree on an apparent conflict.
Currie, supra note 17, at 764.
117. See, e.g., Allo, supra note 5; Kay, supra note 3; and Sedler, supra note 5.
118. See, e.g., D. CAvEas, supra note 4, at 139-81; Weinberg, supra note 5; Weintraub, supra notes 5 and 22;
Baxter, supra note 3. See also Martin, An Approach to the Choice of Law Problem, 35 MERcEs L. Rsv. 583 (1984).
119. The unprovided for case is the converse of a true conflict in the sense that, in this case, no one of the involved
states wants to have its law applied. Currie did not develop any definite solution for this case. He dealt with it primarily
in the context of unconstitutional discrimination, i.e., whether it is constitutionally permissible for the forum to refuse to
extend the benefit of its law to a nonresident litigant. On the choice of law aspect he only gave some tentative suggestions
which he finally rejected in favor of applying the law of the forum "since no good purpose will be served by putting the
parties to the expense and the court to the trouble of ascertaining the foreign law." B. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 156; see
also id. at 152-56. Thus Currie, who for the first time appears sensitive to the problems of the overburdened courts in
ascertaining foreign law, is willing to relieve them from this burden in at least one category of cases. The trouble is,
however, that, under the terms of his analysis, the courts must first ascertain not only the content, but also the policies,
of the foreign law before they can conclude that the foreign state is not interested in applying its law.
120. The unprovided for cases have been far more numerous and far more difficult than Currie had anticipated. See,
inter alia, such textbook favorites as Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 575, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974);
Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973); Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973); Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 385 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). But see Weintraub, supra note 5, at 644-46.
121. According to ProfessorTwerski, "the entire structure of interest analysis crumbled" in the unprovided forcase.
"Having defined the interests as domiciliary oriented, when you run out of domiciliaries to protect you run out of
interests." Twerski, supra note 2, at 108. Equally responsible for this impasse is Currie's single-minded, one dimensional
reading of interests evidenced by his unwillingness to consider interests other than those reflected in the domestic laws
of the involved states. See supra notes 94 and 96.
122. According to McDougal, this solution "makes almost no sense. It is a complete abandonment of interest
analysis. If interests are the important factors at stake in choice-of-law controversies, as they are, then they should be the
critical factor in the resolution of all choice-of-law controversies, not simply some." MeDougal, supra note 4, at 440 n.7.
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considerations that Currie did not consider. In this respect, Sedler's ideal of focusing
on the common policies of the involved states is indeed a valuable suggestion.123
Finally, Currie seems to fall into another inconsistency when, in dealing with the
true conflict before a disinterested forum, he proposes as one solution that the court
decide the case "by a candid exercise of legislative discretion, resolving the conflict
as it believes it would be resolved by a supreme legislative body." 124 It is difficult
to see how the courts, which in Currie's view are unqualified to weigh governmental
interests, are now capable of performing that supreme task. Moreover, it is also
difficult to see why Currie, who had specifically decried a "better-law" approach'2
in any other true conflict, is now willing to trust the judge's preference. 126
VII. FORUM FAVORITISM
The law of the forum dominates Currie's analysis for two reasons: first, because
he begins with the basic presumption that forum law should be applied as a matter of
course, and that only if good reason is shown should the judge consider applying a
law other than his own; 127 and, second, because Currie would apply forum law in all
cases in which the forum has an interest, even though not the stronger one. In effect,
Currie would apply foreign law only in one category of conflicts-a false conflict
in which the forum is not interested. In all other cases he would apply the law of the
forum--(a) in a false conflict in which the forum is the interested state; (b) in a true
conflict in which the forum is one of the interested states; (c) in the unprovided-for
case; and (d) even in a true conflict before a disinterested forum, if the court cannot
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 128
Currie justified his forum favoritism with arguments which ranged from the
practical to the philosophical.' 2 9 Although he easily convinced some judges, 3 0 he
123. According to Sedler, "usually the point as to which the laws of the involved states differ will involve a
substantive rule that is an exception to the common policy reflected in what may be called the general law of both states.
Since the state whose law represents an exception to that common policy has no interest in having its law applied . . . it
is submitted that the common policy should come to the fore, and the exception should not be recognized." Sedler, supra
note 3, at 235. In a case like Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121,286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), the Ontario
guest statute would be the exception to the general compensatory policy of both Ontario and New York. Since Ontario
is not interested in applying its guest statute, since no Ontario host was involved, "the common policy of both states in
favor of recovery should prevail." Sedler, supra note 3, at 235. Sedler's suggestion may provide good practical solutions
for those unprovided for cases that can fit the above factual pattern, but it does not remedy the theoretical deficiencies of
interest analysis in the unprovided for case. For a critical appraisal of Sedler's effort to reformulate interest analysis, see
McDougal, supra note 122.
124. E. CHEATAMt, E. GRIswoLD, W. REEse & M. RosENBEo, CoNstcr or LAws 447-48 (5th ed. 1964).
125. See B. CURI, supra note 1, at 104-06, 154 n.82; Cavers, supra note 65, at 488.
126. Currie's neglect of this category of conflicts is also owed to his assumption that they are extremely rare. See
Currie, supra note 17, at 765, 773. Even though this assumption is now reinforced after Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977), which imposes more limits on transient jurisdiction, the possibility of more such conflicts, particularly in interstate
conflicts, should not be considered so remote. See Tramontana v. S.A. Empressa De Viacao Acrea Rio Grandense, 350
F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
127. See E. CHEATAAM, E. GRISWOLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 124. This peculiarly American
presumption antedates Currie's theory, see, e.g., Cook, supra note 31, and has many followers today. See, e.g., Martin,
supra note 118.
128. See E. CHEATHAM, E. GRISWOLD, W. REEsE & M. ROSENBERO, supra note 124.
129. See. e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 89, 93-94, 191, 197, 278-80, 323, 447, 489-90, 592, 627, 697.
130. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964): "We should apply that choice-of-law rule
which will 'advance the policies or interests of' Oregon. . . . Courts are instruments of state policy." Id. at 549; Foster
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was justifiably attacked by most commentators. 131 In response to this criticism, Currie
tried to mitigate his position in later writings by calling for a "restrained and
enlightened interpretation" of the law of the forum. 132 He did not, however, modify
the basic premises of his theory, especially his view that the courts are not the proper
organs to weigh governmental interests. It goes without saying that such forum
favoritism rewards the forum shopper and runs contrary to the fundamental objectives
of private international law. The constitutional restraints relied upon by Currie to
curtail the forum favoritism generated by his theory have not in fact operated. The
indirect preventive mechanism of Shaffer v. Heitner133 is also largely ineffectual since
a plaintiff usually has more than one forum from which to choose. There remains the
question of whether forum shopping and the concomitant sacrifice of uniformity is a
fair price to pay in exchange for attaining other goals of the choice of law process such
as equity, flexibility, and justice of the end result. The answer, of course, depends on
whether one believes that these other goals are any closer to being achieved today than
they were before the advent of interest analysis.
VIII. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
It has been aptly observed that Currie's "seductive style" has "hypnotized a
whole generation of American lawyers," 13 4 and, one might add, in the same way as
the teachings of Professor Joseph Beale had indoctrinated the previous generation.
Indeed, if Currie's objective was to purge American choice of law thinking from
Bealian theology, he has accomplished that too well. If his objective was to establish
his own new rigid orthodoxy, he has fortunately failed, although probably not as
badly as his critics would like. Fortunately, however, the development of American
conflicts doctrine does not stop with Currie, as it did not stop with Beale. Even Beale
must have known this in 1935 when, in a context more general than conflicts, he
wrote:
The whole history, then, of law is the history of alternate efforts to render the law more
certain and to render it more flexible . . . [T]o a period of strict law, where the one
purpose of law is to secure exactness and certainty, succeeds a period of equity and natural
law in which the purpose is to infuse law with an element of justice and morality and
therefore to temper the exactness of the strict law with a flexibility that may enable it to
perform its function more justly. This in turn is succeeded by a period of maturity in which
the flexibility of the period of equity and natural law is to a degree restrained by legalizing
the broadness of equitable relief and bringing that too under precepts consisting of
v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). Professor Juenger offers many interesting explanations of why interest analysis
is attractive to many judges. Firstly, "[tlhe forum bias of interest analysis frees courts from the chore of having to ascertain
and apply some law to which they are not accustomed." Secondly, the pro-plaintiff or pro-recovery bias inherent in
interest analysis enables courts to strengthen "'the protection of multistate accident victims by filtering out substandard tort
rules." Juenger, supra note 2, at 46. One may add that precisely the same reasons explain the appeal of Leflar's "better
law approach" which attracts Juenger's sympathies.
131. See von Mehren, supra note 2: "Currie's analysis, which compels him to give to the forum's law such broad
effects, would tend to fasten upon the international and the interstate communities . a legal order characterized by
chaos and retaliation." Id. at 97. See also the authors cited, supra note 2.
132. See E. CHiAT.%t, E. GRLswotw, W. REssE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 124; Currie, supra note 17, at 757.
133. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
134. Kom, supra note 2, at 812.
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standards and principles so as to make it more certain. It is to be noticed that in this period
the law does not go back to its earlier exactness, but remains with a more flexible content
than the strict law, although it has gained in certainty over the period of natural law. This
in turn is followed by a period in which again the freer administration of law is
emphasized; a period in which we now live, where the rules and principles of law cause
impatience if too fixed in their application, and a desire exists to individualize their
operation. This is a period where the extreme flexibility of the period of equity and natural
law is not reached for each successive period has left its touch on the law. 35
All that this statement needs to accurately describe the development of American
conflicts law in this century is some updating. Due mostly to the asphyxiating nature
of Beale's own system, the "impatience" of which he spoke exploded into a
revolution, which in turn has been eventually succeeded by a "period of maturity."
This is the "period in which we now live." Our challenge is to bring that maturity
"under precepts consisting of standards and principles so as to make it more
certain;" 36 to regain, in other words, the certainty lost in the revolution by producing
new choice of law rules without the "exactness" and arbitrariness of Beale's rules,
and without the excesses of Currie's revolution. Thanks mostly to Currie, the
arbitrariness of Beale's system need no longer be demonstrated. Thanks to Currie's
critics, and hopefully to this Article, the excesses of Currie's approach should by now
be equally clear. But, as this Article has attempted to demonstrate, there is still
enough raw material in this approach which may be used in building the new system
and making it "an instrument, however imperfect, of interstate and international
mutual justice." 137 In this effort, the survival of interest analysis as a self-contained,
self-sufficient methodology is really of secondary importance. For, as the courts have
demonstrated, appropriate results may be reached even when diverse academic
theories are merged together in an amalgam not recognizable by their authors. 38 But,
if interest analysis is to be buried and forgotten, it should be for the right reasons. If
it is to be abandoned because of its exceedingly combative nature and its notorious
forum favoritism, we would be moving in the right direction of restraining this
epidemic of state antagonism which has little place in a federal system. But if interest
analysis is to be abandoned because "policies do not come equipped with labels
proclaiming their spatial dimension,"' 39 or because "it is a fiction to speak of,
'legislative intent,"'"140 then we would be turning the clock back to 1935. As shown
by the above quoted excerpt, even Beale did not expect this.
135. J. BEALE, A TRE. sE oN mE CONFLicr OF LAWs 50 (1935).
136. Id.
137. Kozyris, supra note 2, at 906.
138. For a good example, see Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978) merging together the approaches of Currie, Baxter, Cavers, von Mehren & Trautman, Freund, and even
Leflar.
139. See Juenger, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
140. See Brilmayer, supra note 48.
[Vol. 46:549
